Abstract. We first propose a general equivalent key recovery attack to a H 2 -MAC variant NMAC1, which is also provable secure, by applying a generalized birthday attack. Our result shows that NMAC1, even instantiated with a secure Merkle-Damgård hash function, is not secure. We further show that this equivalent key recovery attack to NMAC1 is also applicable to NMAC for recovering the equivalent inner key of NMAC, in a related key setting. We propose and analyze a series of NMAC variants with different secret approaches and key distributions, we find that a variant NMAC-E, with secret envelop approach, can withstand most of the known attacks in this paper. However, all variants including NMAC itself, are vulnerable to on-line birthday attack for verifiable forgery. Hence, the underlying cryptographic hash functions, based on Merkle-Damgård construction, should be re-evaluated seriously.
Introduction
HMAC [3, 2] , a derivative of NMAC, is a practically and commonly used, widely standardized MAC construction nowadays. HMAC has two advantages. First, HMAC can make use of current hash functions, the most widely used ones are based on Merkle-Damgård construction [17, 6] , without modification. Second, it is provable secure under two assumptions that the keyed compression function of the underlying hash function and the key derivation function in HMAC are pseudo random functions (PRFs) [2] .
All in all, NMAC is the base of HMAC. For an iterated hash function H with Merkle-Damgård construction, NMAC is defined by
where M is the input message, K in and K out are two random and independent secret n-bit keys.
After some prevalent iterated hash functions were broken [27, 12, 29, 31, 28] , the security of NMAC and HMAC instantiated with those hash function were analysed [4, 8, 25, 30] , which emphasized that NMAC and HMAC instantiated with broken hash functions are weak.
There are mainly three kinds of approaches to construct MAC algorithm by keying hash function in early days, which are secret prefix, secret suffix and secret envelop approaches [24] , respectively. The secret prefix approach prepends a secret K to the message M before hashing computation, which is the basic design unit for NMAC and HMAC. The secret suffix approach appends a secret key K to the message M before hashing computation. The secret envelop approach, involving two keys, prepends a secret key K 1 and appends a secret key K 2 to the message M , respectively, before hashing computation. Based on these approaches and different key distributions, we propose some NMAC variants (also are HMAC variants), and analyze their security, by checking whether they are resistant for known attacks, for a better choice.
This paper analyses the security of the NMAC and its variants based on the assumption that the underlying hash function is secure (weak collision resistance), which is stronger than the origin assumption of that the underlying compression function is a PRF [2] . We find that NMAC is not secure enough to some extent, for example, its inner key is vulnerable to equivalent key recovery attack, which needs O(2 n/2 ) on-line queries and off-line computations, in the related key setting.
Our Contributions. We propose a general equivalent key recovery attack to NMAC 1 by a generalized on-line birthday attack, which needs about 2 n/2 on-line MAC queries, and 2 n/2 off-line MAC computations with any pre-set key. After a inner collision pair (M 0 , M 0 ) is found, we get the exact value of intermediate chaining variable ICV 2 of the inner hashing of NMAC 1 , which conduces to a selective forgery attack directly.
Based on the three earlier approaches to construct MAC algorithms and different key distributions, we propose a series of NMAC variants, we also analyse those variants in order to find a better and securer one. We find a variant of NMAC, named NMAC-E, with the modified version of the secret envelop approach, can withstand all known attacks to MAC algorithms.
Organization of this paper. This paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 recalls the related definitions and background. Section 3 proposes and crypt-analyses some NMAC variants with secret prefix approach. The security of NMAC is also discussed, based on these variants. Section 4 proposes and analyses the security of some NMAC variants with secret suffix approach. We present and analyse a better choice of NMAC variant with the modified version of the secret envelop approach, in section 5. We conclude the paper in the last section.
We first explain some notations related to this paper, then present brief description of cryptographic hash function with Merkle-Damgård structure, some properties of thus function, and finally, we present a brief description of NMAC in this section.
Notations n
The length of hash result b
The length of a message block H A concrete hash function with n-bit result H A hash function without message padding h A compression function with a n-bit and a b-bit inputs, and a n-bit output IV The initial chaining variable of H ICV i The intermediate chaining variables for the i-th iteration of H K A secret key with n bits k in A padded key like k out , with b bits K in A secret key like K out , with n bits x||y The concatenation of two bit strings x and y ⊕ The bit wise exclusive OR pad(M ) The padding bits of M with length information padding The padding bits without length information, e.g. 1||0 * |M | The length of the string M
Brief Description of Merkle-Damgård Hash Function
Cryptographic hash functions with Merkle-Damgård structure compress message M of arbitrary length to a fixed length output H(M ). MD5 [23] and SHA-1 [7] are two typical Merkle-Damgård structure hash functions in use, which takes a variable-length message M (actually, |M | < 2 64 ) as input and outputs a 128-bit and 160-bit hash values, respectively.
M is first padded to be multiples of b bits, a '1', added at the tail of M , followed by '0's, until the bit length becomes (b − 64) on modulo b, and finally, the length of the unpadded message M is added to the last 64 bits. The padded M is further divided into chunks of
The compression function h takes a b-bit block M i and a n-bit chaining variable ICV i , initialized to IV , as input, and outputs ICV i+1 . For example,
. For the details of the concrete compression functions, please refer [22, 23, 7] .
Padding rule. For two arbitrary distinct messages M and M , if |M | = |M |, then, the padding bits of these two messages are just the same. Since MD5 [23] , MD4 [22] and SHA-1 [7] et al. share the same padding procedure, the padding rule is also applicable to them. 1. pre-image resistance: it should be computation infeasible to find a pre-image for a given hash result; 2. collision resistance: it should be computation infeasible to find two different inputs with the same hash result.
For an ideal hash function with n-bit result, finding a pre-image requires approximately 2 n hash operations. On the other hand, finding a collision requires only 2 n/2 hash operations; this follows from the birthday paradox [9] . In this paper, we assume that the underlying hash functions of all MACs are secure, which means (weak) collision resistance.
Kerckhoffs' Principle
Kerckhoffs' Principle. The security of a crypt-system should depend solely on the secrecy of the key (password) [11] .
The principle implies that the security of hash-based MAC should depend solely on the secrecy of the used key, not the MAC form nor the collision resistance of the underlying hash function. It should perform a pre-image attack against the underlying hash function, to break a MAC whose key length is equivalent to the underlying hash result.
Some Basic MAC Forms
There are three kinds of approaches to construct MAC in early days [24] , which are secret prefix, secret suffix, secret envelop, respectively.
Secret Prefix Approach The secret prefix MAC M-P 1 is defined as:
where the IV of H is replaced with a secret key K before hashing computation. This approach is the basic design unit for NMAC and HMAC [3, 2] . However, the secret prefix M-P is vulnerable to the extension attack, which transforms to equivalent key recovery attack eventually [24] . M-P is also vulnerable to on-line birthday attack, which means the security of M-P is dependent on the weak collision resistance (WCR) of the underlying hash function. Secret Suffix Approach The secret suffix MAC M-S is defined as:
where a secret key K is appended to the message M before hashing computation. This approach is vulnerable to off-line birthday attack [24] , which means the security of M-S is solely dependent on the collision resistance (CR) of the underlying hash function. Secret Envelop Approach The secret envelop MAC M-E is defined as:
where the IV of H is replaced with a secret key K 1 , and then the other key K 2 is appended to the message M , before hashing computation. This approach is vulnerable to on-line birthday attack [24] (WCR dependent). M-E is also vulnerable to divide-and-conquer exhaustive-search key recovery [18, 20] , which means that it needs about 2 n+1 operations to recover both keys with n bits each, instead of claimed 2 2n operations [24] .
NMAC
NMAC [3, 2] proposed by Bellare et al., is the basis of the most widely used cryptographic algorithms HMAC. NMAC is built from iterated hash function H, where the IV of H is replaced with a secret n-bit key K, the NMAC algorithm is defined as:
where keys K in , K out ∈ {0, 1} n in NMAC are to replace the IV of hash function H before further process. In practice, both keys are random and independently generated [3] .
The security of Some Variants with Secret Prefix
NMAC applies two keys K in and K out , we first discuss the security of some variants of NMAC through different key deployments, then we analyse the security of NMAC.
The security of NMAC
We define NMAC 1 as:
where the outer key K out is omitted. A keyed input version of NMAC 1 was also proposed by Yasuda equivalent key of H 2 -MAC instantiated with the broken MD5 [29, 31] , with about 2 97 on-line operations [26] . However, we point out that the absence of the outer key is a real threat to the security of H 2 -MAC [15] , which does not exist in HMAC.
On-Line Birthday Attack for Verifiable Forgery Attack If we apply online birthday attack to NMAC 1 oracle, after about 2 n/2 queries, we can get a collision pair (M, M ), which satisfies NMAC 1 (M ) = NMAC 1 (M ). Then NMAC 1 (M ||pad(M )||x) = NMAC 1 (M ||pad(M )||x) always holds, for arbitrary message x. This means that we can generate verifiable forgery of NMAC 1 , we first query the corresponding MAC value of M ||pad(M )||x, and we get the very MAC value for M ||pad(M )||x, eventually.
After about 2 n/2 on-line queries, any verifiable forgery to NMAC 1 , based on the collision pair (M, M ), can be made with one additional on-line query.
Equivalent Key Recovery Attack to NMAC 1 It seems that we can't get the value of H(K in , M ) for the application of outer hashing. To find a way out, we apply the generalized birthday attack with two groups [9] to NMAC 1 and then recover its equivalent key
Here, we first define the notation N 2 as N 2 = H(H(C, M )), where C is an n-bit constant or any parameter known to everybody, for example, the IV of H. Generally speaking, N 2 is the non-key version of NMAC 1 . We use different 1-block messages M 0 s to generate the corresponding NMAC 1 values, and use different 1-block messages M 0 s to generate the corresponding N 2 values. The overall strategy of equivalent key recovery attack to NMAC 1 is shown as follows.
1. Generate a group one G 1 with r = 2 n/2 elements, by computing the corresponding values of H(H(C, M 0 )) for r different Cs and M 0 s, which can be randomly generated. Specifically, C can be set to the IV of H. 2. Generate a group two G 2 with s = 2 n/2 elements, by querying the corresponding values to NMAC 1 oracle with the secret key K in for s different M 0 s, where M 0 s are randomly generated. 3. There is a collision pair (M 0 , M 0 ) that not only satisfies
and NMAC 1 happens), with good probability [9] . 4. Since H(K, M 0 ) = H(C, M 0 ), and we know the value of C and M 0 , we can compute the value of K e = H(K, M 0 ) = H(C, M 0 ). 5. Let pad 0 and pad 1 be the padding bits of M 0 and M 0 ||pad 0 ||x, respectively, for arbitrary message x. Hence, we generate the result of H(K, M 0 ||pad 0 ||x) by computing y = h(K e , x||pad 1 ), then we compute H(y) further, and finally we get the very value of NMAC 1 (K, M 0 ||pad 0 ||x).
Success probability and Complexity. The probability Pr(|G 1 ∩ G 2 )| = 0 that there are no distinct element in the intersection of the two groups is denoted by P (2 n , r, s, 0). Let sp denote the success probability of the above attack (at least one collision pair exists), then we can get the value of sp by computing sp = 1 − P (2 n , r, s, 0)≥0.632 [15] . The elements of group G 1 computed by N 2 need 2 n/2 off-line N 2 computations. The elements of group G 2 computed by NMAC 1 need 2 n/2 on-line NMAC 1 queries. We can store the values of both group using hash table. Then the above algorithm will require O(2 n/2 ) time and space. For more details about this kind of attack and its optimization, please refer [15] , which shows the equivalent key recovery attack to H 2 -MAC. After an inner collision pair (M 0 , M 0 ) is found, we can apply N 2 C (M 0 ) to compute the equivalent key of the NMAC 1 . Finally, we can use the recovered equivalent key K e to launch any selective forgery attack to NMAC 1 without on-line query, based on M 0 , which claims that the security of NMAC 1 is broken.
Hence, we point out that the security of NMAC 1 is solely dependent on the (weak) collision resistance of the underlying hash function, not the strength of the used key.
However, it is interesting to notice that H 2 -MAC, the keyed input version of NMAC 1 , is provable secure under the assumption of that the underlying compression function h is a PRF-AX [33] , which means that (weak) collision resistance of the underlying hash function can be dropped. Thus proof and assumption obvious violate our result.
The security of NMAC 2
We define NMAC 2 as:
where the inner key K in is omitted. This variant NMAC 2 was also noted by Bellare et al. in [3] . The outer hashing only accepts H(M ) as legal input, which is an n-bit value. Though we can learn the value of H(K out , H(M )) easily, we can not use that information to launch the extension attack to NMAC 2 .
Birthday Attack to NMAC 2 We first apply off-line birthday attack to H(M ). After about 2
n/2 off-line computations, we can get a collision pair (M, M ), which satisfies H(M ) = H(M ), and NMAC 2 (M ) = NMAC 2 (M ), eventually. Then, the equation of NMAC 2 (M ||pad(M )||x) = NMAC 2 (M ||pad(M )||x) always holds, for arbitrary message x. This means that we can generate verifiable forgery to NMAC 2 , we first query for the MAC value of M ||pad(M )||x, and we get the MAC value for M ||pad(M )||x, eventually.
After 2 n/2 off-line computations, any verifiable forgery to NMAC 2 , based on the collision pair (M, M ), can be made by additional one on-line query.
The security of NMAC 3
We define NMAC 3 as:
where the inner key and outer are both set to K io .
The on-line birthday attack for verifiable forgery applied to NMAC 1 is also applicable to NMAC 3 . Here, we omit the details, for such verifiable forgery attack can be implemented without any modification.
Further, we point out that the off-line birthday attack to get verifiable forgery is also applicable to NMAC 3 after some optimization. We show the strategy as follows.
1. Query the corresponding MAC value of M 0 to the NMAC 3 oracle, which will answer H(K io , H(K io , M 0 )). 2. Assume the unknown H(K io , M 0 ) be x 0 , and pad 0 be the padding bits of x 0 .
We already know the corresponding value of H(K io , x 0 ) (an equivalent key of the inner hashing), which is NMAC 3 (M 0 ). 3. Based on the known H(K io , x 0 ), we launch an off-line birthday attack. We can find a collision pair (M x , M x ), which satisfies
For arbitrary message x, we can launch a verifiable forgery attack.
However, since the value of H(K io , M 0 ) is unknown, how to use the above information to launch a verifiable forgery attack is still a open problem.
The security of NMAC
As pointed out by Bellare et al., the on-line birthday attack for verifiable forgery attack is also applicable to NMAC [2] , here we omit the details. However, we further notice that we can generate verifiable forgery for NMAC, by off-line birthday attack, which is shown as the attack to NMAC 2 , once the inner key K in is leaked.
Related Key Attack to Recover the Equivalent Inner Key To recover the equivalent inner key K e with n-bit, we have the following setting for our related-key attacks on NMAC.
There are two oracles NMAC (Kout,Kin) and NMAC (K out ,K in ) . The relation between (K out , K in ) and (K out , K in ) is set as follows:
where these two oracles share the same outer key, and the inner key of the oracle NMAC (K out ,K in ) can be any known constant.
The overall strategy of the equivalent inner key recovery attack to NMAC is shown as follows. 
We conclude that the equivalent inner key of NMAC is totally dependent on the generalized birthday attack (WCR), not the strength of the used inner key, in the related key setting.
However, if the outer key K out of NMAC is leaked, then, it needs a generalized birthday attack to recover the equivalent inner key to break the entire system, shown as the attack to NMAC 1 .
From these attacks, we claim that the security of NMAC is dependent on the secrecy of one of the keys, even if its both key are independently and randomly generated.
As pointed out by the editors of Cryptology ePrint Archive in our preliminary version of this paper [14] , the equivalent key recovery attack to NMAC is not applicable to HMAC, since the HMAC keys are derived from a base key, and there exists no related keys.
The security of Some Variants with Secret Suffix
In this section, we discuss the security of some NMAC variants NMAC-S i with secret suffix approach.
We first prove that the security of original secret suffix M-S is totally dependent on the collision resistance (CR) of the underlying hash function. We then discuss the security of some variants of NMAC with secret suffix approach.
The Security of H(M ||K)
For an n-bit key K, we will prove as follows, the security of the secret suffix M-S is totally dependent on the collision resistance of the underlying hash function, instead of the pre-image resistance.
Theorem 1
The security of H(M ||K) is totally dependent on the collision resistance of the underlying hash function H.
We prove Theorem 1 by giving the complexity of the worst case of the key recovery attack and best case attack, respectively, which are all based on the assumption that the message M is multiples of bytes. The worst case of the key recovery attack is that we assume the collision attack of H has no control over the content of the collision pair (M, M ). The best case is that we assume the collision attack has full control over some bytes of the collision pair. We notice that the complexity of the collision attack is 2 n/2 hash compressions by off-line birthday attack, for a hash function H with n-bit output. The attack is based on the "slice-by-slice" key recovery of trail key in secret envelop approach, proposed by Preneel et al. [18] .
Proof. The Best Case. Since the collision attack has full control over some bits of the collision pair, to recover each byte of the key K, only (2 8 − 1) collision pairs must be generated in the worst case. So we need to generate (2 8 − 1)(n/16) collision pairs to recover the first n/2 bits of K, and we can recover the last n/2 bits of K through brute force attack, which needs 2 n/2 hash compressions. So the total complexity of the full key recovery attack is 2 n/2 ×(2
n/16 2 hash compressions. The Worst Case. Since the collision attack has no control over any bit of the collision pair, to recover the j-th (1≤j≤n/8) character of the key K, 2 8·j collision pairs must be first generated. So we can recover the first n/4 bits of the key by generating (2 8 + 2 8·2 + · · · + 2 n/4 ) collision pairs, and we can recover the last 3·n/4 bits through brute force attack, which needs 2 3·n/4 hash compressions. The total complexity is 2 n/2 ·(2 
All in all then, the complexity of the key recovery to H(M ||K) is range from 2 n/2+8+log n/16 2 to 2 n/2+n/4+1 hash compressions, which means that the security of M-S is dependent on the collision resistance of the underlying hash function H, instead of the pre-image resistance.
We list the complexity of key recovery attack to H(M ||K) in Table 1 , with different limitations on the input message M . Word means that M must be multiples of 32-bit words. However, as shown in Table 1 , we point out that both the best and worst case are exhaustive key search, if the message M is multiples of n bits.
The security of NMAC-S 1
We define NMAC-S 1 as:
where the outer key K out is omitted.
Birthday Attack to NMAC-S 1 After about 2 n/2 off-line computations, an inner collision pair (M, M ) will be found, where M and M are multiples of blocks. Hence, we can construct a verifiable forgery for arbitrary x, which satisfies that NMAC-S 1 (M ||x) = NMAC-S 1 (M ||x).
Full Key Recovery Attack to NMAC-S 1 We can directly apply the full key recovery attack to H(M ||K in ), since the outer hashing does not hide the inner collision. After that, we can fully recover the inner key of NMAC-S 1 , and then can construct any verifiable forgery. The complexity of the key recovery attack to NMAC-S 1 can be shown Table 1 .
The security of NMAC-S 2
We define NMAC-S 2 as:
where the inner key K in is omitted.
Birthday Attack to NMAC-S 2 Since the inner collision can't be hidden by the outer hashing with the key K out , we can launch an off-line birthday attack to NMAC-S 2 . After about 2 n/2 off-line computations, an inner collision pair (M, M ) will be found, where M and M are multiples of blocks. Hence, we can construct a verifiable forgery for arbitrary x, which satisfies that NMAC-S 2 (M ||x) = NMAC-S 2 (M ||x). We first query the corresponding MAC value of M ||x to the NMAC-S 2 oracle, then, we get the very result for M ||x.
However, it seems that no key recovery attack to NMAC-S 2 can be launched as NMAC-S 1 . H(M ) is n bits long, and K out is also n bits, which means that the concatenation of both are inside one block, so the slice-by-slice key recovery strategy can't be applied. Exhaustive search must be performed to break the outer key K out , whose complexity is 2 n MAC computations.
The security of NMAC-S 3
We define NMAC-S 3 as:
where the inner and outer keys are equal.
Birthday Attack to NMAC-S 3 Since the inner collision can't be hidden by the outer hashing with the key K io , we can launch an off-line birthday attack to NMAC-S 3 . After about 2 n/2 off-line computations, an inner collision pair (M, M ) will be found, where M and M are multiples of blocks. Hence, we can construct a verifiable forgery for arbitrary x, which satisfies that NMAC-S 3 (M ||x) = NMAC-S 3 (M ||x). We first query the corresponding MAC value of M ||x to the NMAC-S 3 oracle, then, we get the very result for M ||x.
Key Recovery Attack to NMAC-S 3 We can directly apply the full key recovery attack to H(M ||K io ), since the outer hashing does not hide the inner collision. After that, we can fully recover the inner key K io , which is also the outer key, of NMAC-S 3 . Finally, we can construct any verifiable forgery. The complexity of the key recovery attack to NMAC-S 3 , which is analogous to NMAC-S 1 , is also shown in Table 1 .
The security of NMAC-S
We define NMAC-S as:
where the inner and outer keys are different.
Birthday Attack to NMAC-S Since the inner collision can't be hidden by the outer hashing with the key K out , we can launch an off-line birthday attack to HMAC-S. After about 2 n/2 off-line computations, an inner collision pair (M, M ) will be found, where M and M are multiples of blocks. Hence, we can construct a verifiable forgery for arbitrary x, which satisfies that NMAC-S(M ||x) = NMAC-S(M ||x). We first query the corresponding MAC value of M ||x to the HMAC-S oracle, then, we get the very result for M ||x.
Inner Key Recovery Attack to NMAC-S We can directly apply the full key recovery attack to H(M ||K in ), since the outer hashing does not hide the appearance of the inner collision. After that, we can fully recover the inner key K in of NMAC-S. However, with K in , we can't directly construct any verifiable forgery, thanks to the outer hashing with the unknown K out . The outer key K out can't be recovered like K in , which is also analysed in NMAC-S 2 . It seems that we have to apply another off-line birthday attack to H(M ), for a meaningful verifiable forgery.
Counterpart for the Key Recovery Attack to NMAC-S Variants
To avoid the full key recovery attack to NMAC-S Variants, we modify the inner hashing form H(M ||Kin). Let pad be the padding bits of M , we re-define the inner hashing form as:
where the inner key K in resides on the last block, exactly on the first n bits of the entire b bits. Hence, slice-by-slice key recovery strategy can't be applied any more, for launching key recovery attack. However, the NMAC-S Variants after modification are still vulnerable to offline birthday attack for verifiable forgery attack.
In last two sections, we discuss the security of NMAC variants with secret prefix and secret suffix, respectively. In this section, we discuss the security of an NMAC variant, NMAC-E, with secret envelop approach.
A Modified Secret Envelop
We first propose a modified version of the secret envelop approach, which has the advantage of both equivalent key recovery resistance and slice-by-slice key recovery resistance. The modification is straightforward, we pad the input message M with pad, which can be some fixed constants, before appending the second key K i2 . We define the modified secret envelop M-E as:
where K i1 and K i2 are both n-bit keys. Both keys can be generated from a base key K, or generated randomly and independently. |M ||pad| is multiples of blocks long. K i2 resides on the first n bits of the last block.
Security Analysis. M-E is still vulnerable to the divide-and-conquer exhaustive search key recovery [18] , hence, both keys can be generated from a base key K without security loss. However, off-line birthday attack can't be applied thanks to the secret "IV", the K i1 , and equivalent key recovery attack can't be launched thanks to the appended key K i2 . Further, slice-by-slice key recovery attack can be avoided for the pad of M , as a result, the appended key can't be split into any slice. Finally, M-E is vulnerable to on-line birthday attack for verifiable forgery, in fact, it seems that modifications must be made to the design criteria of the underlying hash function [19, 5, 10, 21, 32] , in order to avoid this kind of attack.
The security of NMAC-E
We define NMAC-E as:
NMAC-E = NMAC-E (Ko1,Ko2,Ki1,Ki2) = H(K o1 , M-E (Ki1,Ki2) ||K o2 ) where all of the four keys are b-bit keys, which are generated randomly and independently.
Off-Line Birthday Attack Resistance. NMAC-E is resistant to off-line birthday attack for verifiable forgery, thanks to the secret "IV", the K i1 . Without any knowledge about the "IV", the off-line birthday attack to find a collision pair can't be launched.
Equivalent Key Recovery Attack Resistance. NMAC-E is resistant to equivalent key recovery attack, thanks to the appended key K i2 . Even if the attacker can find out the result of M-E(K i1 , K i2 ), no extension attack can be launched, hence, no equivalent key recovery attack happens.
